A Case for Hard Determinism.
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First, I will tie free will to moral responsibility. Then I will give an overview of compatibilism with specific examples. After that, I will argue that it’s not worth accepting because it’s evasive and doesn’t line up with our idea of freedom. Then I will move on to give an overview of libertarianism with specific examples. After that, I will argue that it’s not worth accepting because it is convoluted and magical. Then I will give an overview of hard determinism with give specific examples. After that, I will argue that it’s worth accepting because neuroscience shows that most actions arise from the unconscious mind which we have no direct access to or control over. Then I will use Smilansky’s argument that a hard determinist morality is purer than a compatibilist or a libertarian morality. Furthermore, human freedom is further restricted because many patterns of thought are hardwired. After that, I will tie neuroscience to morality. Then I will argue that morality is possible without moral responsibility. Finally, I will defend hard determinism against some standard objections.
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- Degree
Bachelor
- Level
Undergraduate
- Discipline
Philosophy
- Grantor
Hanover College
- Advisor
Bates, Jared
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MLA citation style (9th ed.)
Hanover College. 2018. hanover.hykucommons.org/concern/etds/ff351101-d0d5-49f6-a57a-2a395a7eb03a. A Case for Hard Determinism.APA citation style (7th ed.)
(2018). A Case for Hard Determinism. https://hanover.hykucommons.org/concern/etds/ff351101-d0d5-49f6-a57a-2a395a7eb03aChicago citation style (CMOS 17, author-date)
A Case for Hard Determinism. Hanover College. 2018. https://hanover.hykucommons.org/concern/etds/ff351101-d0d5-49f6-a57a-2a395a7eb03a.Note: These citations are programmatically generated and may be incomplete.
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