Empathy has been widely intertwined with the concept of morality for centuries, with many sentimentalist philosophers believing it to be the “holy grail” of ethical advancement. However, rationalists have continually fought back, arguing that reason and rational processes play a larger role in morality than sentimentalists allow for. Here, I challenge the notion that empathic and affective deficits in autistic and psychopathic individuals point to a nature of moral judgement making rooted in empathy. I assess whether empathy is necessary for making moral judgements, fostering moral development or generating moral motivation, concluding through philosophical argument and empirical research regarding ethical experiences in autistic and psychopathic individuals, that empathy is not necessary for either three components of morality. I then challenge the notion that a heavy cultivation of empathy should continue to be emphasized, by evaluating the cognitive biases that underlie the empathic process and the harm that they can bring. Ultimately, I argue that there is more than one way to make a moral judgement and ethics is not always grounded in empathy, as Hume once proposed.